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Addressing the Debt Crisis in the European Union: The
Validity of Mandatory Collective Action Clauses and
Extended Maturities
Jason B. Gott*
Abstract
The sovereign debt crisis in the European Union has put signficant pressure on the
fundamental divisions ofpower between the Union government and member states. One part of
the recommended solution for the crisis calls for the imposition of mandatory collective action
clauses and extended maturiies for all sovereign bonds issued by member states, the first
instances of Union-wide fiscal polig choices being forced upon member states. After an
explanation of the relevant bond terms, this Comment evaluates the validity of the proposed
mandates based on the current state of the framework of power in the EU and concludes that
the mandates are valid under the EU implied powers doctrine. The Comment also explains
why the acceptance or rejection of these bond-term mandates has the potential to lead to either
the full integration or dissolution of the E U.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The European Union
"We must now face the difficult task of moving towards a single economy,
a single political entity. For the first time since the fall of the Roman Empire we
have the opportunity to unite Europe."' Debates about the nature of the
European Union (EU or Community) project-is it economic, monetary,
political?-have raged on and off since its creation in 1992. Some, like former
EU Commission President Romano Prodi, quoted above, both see it as and
want it to be political, a true integration of Europe into a super-state. Others
passionately oppose that position, viewing the migration of sovereignty to the
supra-national level as a dangerous trend.2
In 1993, a group of European countries continued the historic trend
toward integration and became party to the Maastricht Treaty, the foundational
document establishing the constitutional basis of the current EU.3 The creation
of the EU marked the next step for a European community looking to enhance
cooperation and peace among the continent's several nations.4 But there was
much debate and criticism over whether the Maastricht Treaty was a step
forward or backward in that regard. Critics argued that it embodied a net loss of
1 Sharon Ellul Bonici, The Gahan Syndrome, The Malta Independent (May 20, 2000), online at
http://www.imperium-europa.org/mediaclips/article.php?id=18) (visited Jan 12, 2011), quoting
Romano Prodi, Speech Before European Parliament (Oct 13,1999).
2 See generally Robert Harmsen and Menno Spiering, Eurosceptidsm: Party Polics, NationalIdenliy and
European Integration, 20 Eur Stud: Am J Eur Culture, Hist & Polit 1 (Rodopi 2005).
3 Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) (1992), 31 ILM 247 (Feb 7, 1992).
4 See Paul Craig and Grainne de Burca, EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials 14 (Oxford 4th ed 2008).
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unity and coherence among members, as it deconstructed the "cohesive legal
unit" previously in place and left behind a system of "chaos and fragmentation"
in the form of endless opt-outs and exceptions known as "variable geometry."'
Others felt that it was this very system of variable geometry that made the EU
more integrative, more susceptible to greater and freer participation by members
over time.' As this narrative suggests, the one point both sides agreed on was
that the Maastricht Treaty provided for increased national sovereignty relative to
previous continental regimes, regardless of whether the EU's power was set at a
desirable level.
Since 1993, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) as it emerged from
Maastricht has been amended three times, with the most recent changes taking
effect in 2009 after the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon.7 With each successive
amendment, the EU formally grew in its authority by explicit additions to its
powers and objectives.' On top of this formal growth, the EU's real power
expanded through increasingly loose judicial construction of the TEU and its
powers framework.9 The evolution of the TEU and the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU, and together with TEU, the
Treaties) has also led to increased, though still limited, peremptory authority for
the EU in fiscal and budgetary matters." Yet the current status and the future
objectives of the EU as a political union remain highly controversial."
B. The EU Sovereign Debt Crisis
In early 2010, worries began growing about the continued solvency of
several European countries, with Greece being the foremost focus of concern.12
s See, for example, Deirdre Curtin, The Constitutiona/ Structure of the Union: A Europe of Bits and Pieces,
30 Common Mkt L Rev 17, 28, 67 (1993).
6 Craig and de Burca, EULaw at 19 (cited in note 4).
7 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the
European Community, 2007 OJ (C 306) (Dec 17, 2007).
8 Craig and de Burca, EU Law at 101 (cited in note 4).
9 Id.
10 Id at 753; The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2008 OJ (C 115/47) (Sept 5,
2008).
" See generally Harmsen and Spiering, 20 Eur Stud: A J of Fur Culture, Hist & Polit 1 (cited in note
2).
12 See generally European Commission, Public Finances in EMU 2010 (EU 2010), online at
http://ec.europa.eu/economy-finance/publications/european-economy/2010/pdf/ee-2010-
4_en.pdf (visited Feb 25, 2011); Patrick Allen, Sovereign Debt Crisis Likely to Spread: Roubini (CNBC
Apr 21, 2010), online at
http://www.cnbc.com/id/36681836/Sovereign.Debt CrisisLikely-toSpreadRoubini (visited
Feb 25, 2011).
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Observers around the world understood the danger posed by a sovereign default
in the EU, especially in the context of the protracted recession plaguing the
global economy.' In addition to the actual financial damage from default, the
devastating effects of contagion in other members of the closely integrated EU
or countries outside of it had the potential to completely derail the world's
economic recovery. And indeed, while the concerns over the Greek balance
sheet widened yield spreads and deepened that country's difficulties, fear spread
to other European countries with troublesome books, including Ireland,
Portugal, and Spain. 14 As 2010 wore on, even France and Germany started to
receive mention on the debt crisis watch list."s
Meanwhile, on May 2, 2010, Greece became the first EU member state to
succumb to the financial pressures of overspending and insufficient revenues, as
had been anticipated. Faced with record budget deficits, escalating borrowing
costs, and potential default, the Greek government agreed to terms of a bailout
package with EU members and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), drawing
on the newly-improvised European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF)." But the
bailout did not come without costs: as a condition of receiving the money (Cl 10
billion), Greece agreed to enact an aggressive package of fiscal policies-
designed to slash spending and increase government revenues-that have been
generally coined "austerity measures."" The measures have had some effect to
date, but the final results are uncertain at best."
13 See Brian Blackstone, Tom Lauricella, and Neil Shah, Global Markets Shudder Doubts About U.S.
Economg and a Debt Crunch in Europe jolt Hopes for a Recovey, Wall St J (Feb 4, 2010), online at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704041504575045743430262982.html (visited
Jan 12, 2011).
14 Id.
15 See, for example, Vincent Fernando, Morgan Stanley: Europe's Sovereign Debt Crisis Could Next Hit
France and Germany (Businessinsider.com Sept 9, 2010), online at
http://www.businessinsider.com/morgan-stanley-europes-sovereign-debt-crisis-could-next-hit-
france-and-germany-2010-9 (visited Jan 12, 2011) (relaying statements ofJoachim Fels, co-head of
the Global Economics Team and Chief Global Fixed Income Economist at Morgan Stanley).
16 See Euroone approves massive Greece bail-out, BBC News (May 2, 2010), online at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8656649.stm (visited Apr 22, 2011). See also About EFSF (EFSF
2011), online at http://www.efsf.europe.eu/about/index.htm (visited Apr 30, 2011).
17 See Greece's austerity measures, BBC News (May 5, 2010), online at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10099143 (visited Jan 12, 2011).
18 See Helena Smith, Greece seeks longer to repay C1 10bn IMF bailout loan as austerit bites, The Guardian
(Dec 6, 2010), online at http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/dec/06/debt-crisis-greece
(visited Jan 12, 2011).
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Additionally, in November 2010, Ireland faced the music and accepted a
similar bailout package from the EU and IMF. 9 The total bailout for Ireland ran
to the tune of C85 billion,20 attenuating further the limited resources committed
to the temporary EFSF.
The dwindling of resources available for rescue packages like those
received by Greece and Ireland is one of the foremost reasons that EU and
world leaders are so concerned about the risk of contagion and a spreading debt
crisis.2' With investors and regulators still keeping a fearful eye on Portugal,
Spain, Italy, and France, the severity of the situation has only worsened.2 If a
country with an economy as large as Spain's or Italy's were to need rescuing, the
remaining funds might not be enough to cover its deficit, let alone if multiple
countries their size were to seek a bailout. 23 Haunted by this specter, EU leaders
recognized the vital importance of establishing a program that could help to
alleviate this debt crisis and prevent or head off future ones.24
C. The European Stability Mechanism
On December 17, 2010, the European Council (EC) issued a decision
establishing the foundation for a permanent tool for preventing future debt
crises.25 In that statement, the EC proposes creating the European Stability
Mechanism (ESM), which is intended to be the primary weapon in combating
19 James G. Neuger and Simon Kennedy, Ireland Gets $113 Billion Bailout as EU Ministers Seek to Halt
Debt Crisis, Bloomberg News (Nov 29, 2010), online at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-
11-28/ireland-wins-eu85-billion-aid-germany-drops-threat-on-bonds.html (visited Jan 12, 2011).
20 Id.
21 EFSF has a current lending capacity of roughly C250 billion, to be raised eventually to C440
million. See EU Leaders Agree EFSF to Have Higher Capaao ly June, CNBC (Mar 25, 2011), online
at http://mobile.cnbc.com/eur-news/42262542/1 (visited Apr 25, 2011). The bailout packages
for Ireland, Greece, and Portugal have already totaled e270. See Jaoa Lima, Jim Silver, and
Anabela Reis, Portugal Set to Start Talks on $107 Billion Bailout as Spain Threat Eases, Bloomberg
News (Apr 7, 2011) online at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-06/portugal-seeks-eu-
bailout-after-yields-surge.html (visited Apr 25, 2011); Eura.one approves Greece bail-out (cited in note
16); Neuger and Kennedy, Ireland Gets Bailout (cited in note 19).
22 See note 21 and sources cited therein.
23 See Gideon Rachman, The euro crisis, Ita/y and its playful premier, Financial Times (Apr 11, 2011)
online at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2971a046-6474-1 leO-a69a-
00144feab49a.html#axzzlJtLGagPs (visited Apr 18, 2011) ("A Spanish bail-out, if it were ever to
happen, would be much bigger-although the EU could probably still manage. But Italy is too big
to bail.").
24 See European Council, Conclusions 16-17 December 2010, EUCO 30/10, 1 (Dec 17, 2010) ("The
temporary stability tools put in place earlier this year have proved their utility, but the crisis has
demonstrated that there can be no complacency.").
25 Id.
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debt crises in the EU beginning in June 2013, via amendment to the TFEU.2 6
The EC also goes beyond this ex post, symptom-focused solution, stating that
the system as a whole will require two important legal changes to the contracts
governing the sovereign debt causing all these problems: inclusion of collective
action clauses and extension of maturity terms. 27
Set to replace the recently improvised EFSF and European Financial
Stabilisation Mechanism in June 2013, ESM is essentially a pool of financial aid
for troubled countries that may only be accessed by accession to stringent fiscal
policies, often referred to generally as austerity measures.28 ESM in that way
formalizes on a permanent basis the practice pursued thus far by the EU and the
IMF in lending to Greece and Ireland.29 Clearly, one goal of ESM is to alleviate
the immediate financial pressures of countries in distress while attempting to
correct underlying budgetary problems. Although there is much to be discussed
about ESM, its aims and structure are beyond the scope of this Comment.30
Instead, this Comment concerns itself with the subtler changes proposed
by the EC: requiring member states to include collective action clauses in their
bond issuances and to extend the maturity terms of future issuances. The legal
nuances of these contract terms will be explained further in Section II, but a
cursory initial understanding will suffice to permit an understanding of the
controversy at hand.
In a general sense, collective actions clauses (CACs) provide a means by
which the terms of a bond may be altered by the consent of some portion of the
bondholders."1 The specifics of the process vary between different bonds, but
the seeming aim of the EC in requiring CACs is to ensure that all European
bonds contain some mechanism that allows an issuer and bondholders to come
together, work out private solutions to the issuer's financial crisis, and prevent a
default. Such private solutions could perhaps obviate, coincide with, or even
become a condition of gaining access to the ESM.
The second bond-related aspect of the EC's statement may be more
recommendation than requirement, in that it declares that "Member States will
26 Id at 4.
27 Id at 9.
28 European Council, Condusions at 8-9 (cited in note 24).
29 See Euroone approves massive bail-out (cited in note 16); Neuger and Kennedy, Ireland (cited in note
19).
3 If for no other reason, "constitutional" discussion of ESM as proposed is moot in that the EC's
recommendation entails amending the founding treaties to provide specifically for the power to
set up ESM.
31 Robert B. Ahdieh, The Role of Groups in Norm Transformation: A Dramatic Sketch, in Three Parts, 6 Chi
J Intl L 231, 241-42 (2005).
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strive to lengthen the maturities of their new bond emissions in the medium-
term to avoid refinancing peaks."3 2 For the purposes of this Comment, though,
the maturity term provision will be taken as a mandate. The goal of this
provision is straightforward: to avoid the primary problem in any sovereign debt
crisis-namely, the government not having the funds available to pay large
chunks of principal coming due from multiple issuances at roughly the same
time. Thus, if issuers provide for longer maturities in place of the shorter
maturities that turn over quickly and possibly in bunches, they may avoid the
disastrous bond overlapping that often leads to insolvency.
With this preliminary understanding of the EC statement, it is clear that
these changes are Council-determined fiscal policy that will be required of all EU
member states. Thus, the question arises: do EU bodies have the power to enact
these recommendations as legislation binding on member states?
Complicating the picture is the TEU, which premises EU power on
principles of conferral, subsidiarity, and proportionality.33 Sorting out the
interplay of those principles with respect to the EC's decision on the ESM will
be the primary objective of this Comment. After examining the foundational
treaties of the EU, and considering potential arguments supporting and
opposing this particular exercise of power, this Comment will posit that the
actions taken by the EC with regard to European bond indentures should be
considered a valid action in connection with establishing the ESM under the
implied powers doctrine, as recognized by the EU judiciary.
D. Consequences
The crisis and its resolution, as suggested by this introduction, may end up
becoming a historical turning point for the EU.3 4 Despite the seeming
inconsequence of the bond term mandates, the fact is that these would be
uniform fiscal laws imposed on member states by the EU bodies-an
unprecedented step. Unlike in the US, where the passage of two-plus centuries
has mostly settled the federalism debate, the EU is in a more infantile stage of its
existence. In fact, the EU today could be better likened to the antebellum US,
32 European Council, Conclusions at 9 (cited in note 24).
33 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Art 5, 2010 OJ (C 83) 18 ("TEU").
34 See Michael Leonard, EU Sovereign Debt Crisis: From Monetary to Fiscal Union (Gerson Lehman
Group June 15, 2010), online at http://www.glgroup.com/News/EU-Sovereign-Debt-Crisis--
From-Monetary-to-Fiscal-Union-48952.html (visited Feb 25, 2011); Michael D. Bordo, The Euro
Needs a Fiscal Union: Some Lessons fmm History 4 (Shadow Open Market Committee Oct 12, 2010),
online at http://shadowfed.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Bordo-Euro-Needs-A-Fiscal-
Union.pdf (visited Feb 25, 2011).
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where the unknowns of dual sovereignty remained unresolved." And like the
antebellum States, the EU could be headed for a momentous occasion that will
force a decision as to whether the members will either truly integrate or call off
the project. Of course, events could unfold in any number of ways. But, as
pertains to this Comment, there are two salient considerations: (1) the crisis itself
and (2) the reaction to the ESM. Further, each of these factors potentially cuts
two ways, both toward and away from integration.
First, the occurrence of the 2010 crisis and the bailout response
implemented thus far have both inspired desire for greater EU oversight and
influence and engendered resentment between the core and the periphery of the
EU. For example, Angela Merkel, the Chancellor of Germany-a country that
has historically stood in strident opposition to extensive integration-changed
her tune in the midst of the crisis, indicating openness to EU-level economic
governance.36 In turn, the German people have turned up the volume of their
dissension with regard to Germany's continued sponsorship of the lending
facilities that have bailed out Greece and Ireland." This dynamic in Germany
will almost certainly persist into the future and may even serve as the
crystallizing force in the debate over the ESM. In fact, the Germans may be the
most likely party to challenge the bond term mandates, if anyone is to do it.
The general reaction to the ESM will likely resemble the reaction to the
lending facilities already established in response to the crisis. In both the core
and the periphery of the EU, there has been disapproval of the EFSF among the
citizenry. People in the core, like the Germans, do not want their tax dollars
spent on resolving other countries' problems.38 People in the periphery, like the
Greeks, resent the interference into their national autonomy that has
accompanied bailout loans as well as the increased public focus on their
finances." That dissent among the citizens has already begun to be felt by
35 See Bordo, Euro Needs Fiscal Union at 2 (cited in note 34). See generally Ernest A. Young, Protecting
Member State Autonomy in the European Union: Some Cautionary Tales from Ameican Federafism, 77 NYU
L Rev 1612 (2002).
36 See Stephen Castle, Merkel, In Reversal, Urges Rescue ofEuro, NY Times B1 (Feb 4, 2011).
37 See Jens Bastian, Euro Gets Cold Shoulder at Ballot Box of Outrage, Bloomberg News (Feb 22, 2011),
online at http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-02-22/euro-gets-cold-shoulder-at-ballot-
box-of-outrage-jens-bastian.html (visited Feb 24, 2011).
38 See id. See also Andrew Ward, Finland plays down Lisbon bail-out fears, Financial Times (Apr 17,
2011) online at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/aeed63d4-68d6-1 1eO-9040-
00144feab49a.html#axzzljtLGagPs (visited Apr 18, 2011) (describing the "public anger over the
succession of taxpayer-funded rescue packages for crisis-hit eurozone countries").
39 See Greek unemployment hits new high, as protests continue against austedi~y measures, Associated Press (Feb
10, 2011), online at http://finance.yahoo.com/news/Greek-unemployment-at-new-apf-
2437081264.html?x=0&.v=3 (visited Apr 23, 2011); Colm Heatley and Finbarr Flynn, Angy Irish
Set to Ditch Government in Historic' Election, Business Week (Feb 25, 2011), online at
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politicians.40 Yet, political leaders have generally supported the EFSF, even in
the core;41 and of course, there are large segments of the European population
that accept and support the EU's response to the debt crisis.
Because the ESM is intended to continue the same lending practices as the
EFSF and to incorporate the additional bond term mandates at issue in this
Comment, it seems sensible to conclude that this further interference will make
the ESM less desirable to EU citizens than the EFSF, or equally desirable at
best. The sentiment of politicians could also turn south, either as a result of
popular backlash or as simple resistance to the political control being exerted by
the EU. On the other hand, greater control and interdependence between
member states may eventually be seen as a net positive for all involved, meaning
affirmative support for the ESM.
Overall, though the end game is decidedly uncertain, the enactment of the
ESM and its bond term provisions could tip off a chain of reactions leading to
either true integration or dissolution of the EU. Accepting the bond term
mandates as legitimate EU actions leaves members with little room to dissent to
future fiscal policy-setting by the EU, whether it be in the form of general
budgetary restrictions, taxation requirements, or prescribed funding for certain
programs. The mandates could thus be the first step toward true fiscal union and
eventually political integration. If, on the other hand, the mandates are
challenged but upheld, such could be the impetus for a withdrawal by an
unhappy member state. As the most likely candidates for opposition and
withdrawal are in the core, this could destroy the EU. Of course, all this
speculation comes with the caveat that if the bond term mandates were
challenged successfully, this "either-or" hypothetical would be moot. But the
possibility remains and should not be discounted, particularly in the context of
setting bounds on EU power. In fact, the debate on the extent of EU power
should probably be thought of as one and the same as the debate on
integration.42
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-02-25/angry-irish-set-to-ditch-government-in-
historic-election.html (visited Feb 26, 2011).
40 See Bastian, Euro Gets Cold Shoulder (cited in note 37); Ward, Finland plays down Lisbon bail-out fears
(cited in note 38).
41 See Euro rone leaders ready to ensure adequate funds for EFSF, Reuters (Dec 16, 2010), online at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/16/eu-summit-efsf-idUSLDE6BF28620101216
(visited Feb 25, 2011).
42 See Franz C. Mayer, Corpetences-Reloaded? The Vertical Division of Powers in the EU and the New
European Constitution, 3 IndJ Const L 493, 493 (2005).
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Collective Action Clauses
For basically the entire twentieth century, sovereign debt contracts almost
uniformly contained unanimous action clauses (UACs), which provided a means
by which bondholders could act as a group and vote to change the terms of a
bond.43 As implied, the vote required unanimous approval. But, between 2003
and 2004, the traditional practice of including UACs gave way to a "wholesale"
shift to use of collective action clauses (CACs), which allows a subset of the
bondholders, albeit a supermajority, to agree to term amendments in the
bonds." Importantly, that supermajority has the power to bind a resistant,
dissenting minority to the new terms. 45 Typically, CACs not only prescribe the
size of the majority needed for an amendment, but also set out other parameters,
including quorum size, types of clauses eligible for amendment, and fairly
specific procedural requirements such as those for notice of the bondholders'
meeting. Thus, CACs serve an important role in organizing a country's creditors
in a way similar to how bankruptcy law prevents a collective action problem for
private debtors."
For example, consider the CAC from Portugal's 2010 e5 Billion Medium
Term Note Programme. 47 The prescribed process for making changes to
"Reserved Matters" requires the representation of 75 percent of the aggregate
affected debt to be represented at the vote (or 25 percent on reconvening an
adjourned meeting). "Reserved Matters" in turn is defined in the Terms and
Conditions and basically covers any direct changes that could be made to reduce
the amount owed to the bondholders, such as reducing the amount of principal
owed, reducing the interest rate to be paid, or changing any fixed date of
payment. For other matters (except for formal, minor, technical, or corrective
changes that may be undertaken unilaterally by Portugal), the meeting requires
only a 50 percent quorum, or a minimum of two representatives on reconvening
after an adjournment.
43 See Ahdieh, 6 Chi J Ind L at 241-42 (cited in note 31).
44 Id at 242. There are, accurately speaking, many types of mechanisms that are considered collective
action clauses, but the supermajority restructuring mechanism is the most common.
45 See Anna Gelpern and Mitu Gulati, Pubic Symbol in Private Contract: A Case Study, 85 Wash U L
Rev 1627, 1639-42 (2006).
46 Id.
47 Simphfed Base Prospectus: The Republc of Portugal EUR 5,000,000,000 EURO Medium Term Note
Programme 37-39 (Feb 11, 2010) (on file with the author; also available through the Thomson
ONE Banker electronic database). The collective action clause in the Portuguese Programme is
Term 18, "Meetings of Noteholders; Modification and Waiver."
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If a quorum is present at a meeting, modifications must be approved by
Extraordinary Resolution, a term that, according to the definitions in the Terms
and Conditions, is defined in the Agency Agreements governing this note
program. Unfortunately, copies of those agreements were not attainable.
Because this bond program is governed by English law, determining the typical
majority required for an extraordinary resolution under English law seemingly
provides strong guidance on this uncertainty: that majority is three-quarters.4 8
The requirement could also be two-thirds or other supermajority.
From a policy perspective, the salient considerations here are the pricing
effect that CACs have on sovereign bonds and the restructuring flexibility they
create. CACs create two contravening effects on the level of security, and
therefore the price, of bonds containing them. On one hand, creating the
opportunity for private workouts opens the possibility that default may be
avoided in a crisis situation, leading eventually to full or greater repayment.
Thus, in this sense, CACs should increase the security and the price of bonds.
But, on the other hand, the fact that CACs allow a portion of bondholders to
make changes that affect all bondholders means that each bondholder faces the
risk that his bond will become less valuable in the future. That risk is very
concerning for bondholders, because it is the one way (other than default) in
which their earnings may be reduced without their consent. It is difficult to
assess which of these two effects is the more potent, and in theory, it seems
plausible that opposite net impacts are possible given different issuers. In
particular, and as this narrative suggests, more credit-worthy, stable issuers
would likely see a reduction in borrowing costs from CACs, while borrowing for
higher-risk issuers would become more expensive with their inclusion.49
Regardless of the pricing effects of CACs, the Council apparently desires the
flexibility they present for finding private solutions outside of resorting (or in
addition) to the ESM."0
48 In the absence of copies of the agreement, other English law sources provide guidance on likely
terms for determining majority requirement. See Stewart Rapaije and Robert L. Lawrence, A
Ditionary ofAmerican and Engish Law 1116 (Lawbook Exchange 2002).
49 For a full discussion on these theories of the pricing effects of collective action clauses, see Barry
Eichengreen and Ashoka Mody, Would Collectve Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs? (Cal Dept of
Econ 1999), online at http://www.econ.berkeley.edu/-eichengr/research/governinglaw6.pdf
(visited Jan 30, 2011).
5 See European Council, Conclusions at 9 (cited in note 24).
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B. Maturity Terms
Perhaps the most fundamental and important term in a sovereign bond,
the maturity term, is "the date when a debt falls due."" The maturity term, in
other words, usually sets the date on which the principal originally paid for the
bond will (hopefully) be repaid to the bondholder. In the context of the current
EU debt crisis, maturity terms, and more particularly the peaking of maturity
dates on multiple bonds, are the most problematic component of European
sovereign bonds. In fact, Greece not only encountered this peaking problem
with its bond issuances, but also faced the prospect of dealing with it again with
the maturity terms on the bailout loans it received from the EU and IMF.5 2
Accordingly, European finance ministers sought a plan to extend and spread out
the maturity dates on those loans to avoid a potentially problematic repayment
hump.1
There are two distinct policy concerns that drive the choice of a maturity
term. The first derives from the peaking concern described above. When issuing
a new bond, a country will (or should) consider what other outstanding bonds it
has issued in the past and when those bonds will come due. To avoid the
problematic overlap that Greece faces, the maturity dates should be spread out
to make them manageable given the issuer's ability to repay or obtain
refinancing.
Second, maturity terms are a pivotal factor in determining the yield
investors will demand from the issuer in order to purchase the bond, which in
turn determines the cost of financing for the issuer. Bonds with long maturity
terms are necessarily riskier than those with shorter terms. One reason is that
there is a greater risk of some event-internal or external-rendering the issuer
unable to repay when there is more time in which that event could occur. More
risk means a higher premium, making longer maturity terms more expensive to
the issuer and less sustainable.54 But issuing short-term bonds increases the risk
of peaking, meaning these two concerns must be weighed against one another in
setting a maturity date.
51 Bryan A. Garner, ed, Black's Law Ditionary 423 (West 8th ed 2004).
52 See Natalie Weeks and Maria Petrakis, Greece Says No Debt Restructring Amid 'Compicated' EU
Talks, Bloomberg News (Jan 19, 2011), online at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-
19/greece-says-no-debt-restructuring-amid-complicated-eu-talks.htmI (visited Jan 21, 2011).
s3 See id.
5 Laura Alfaro and Fabio Kanczuk, Sovereign Debt: Indexation and Maturiy 20 (Inter-American
Development Bank 2006), online at
http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=845647 (visited Jan 23, 2011).
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C. Framework of Power in the EU
The basic tenet of power at the EU-level is that the EU's authority is
limited to the areas in which it has been given power. Accordingly, the powers,
or competences," of the EU-level entities are governed by three basic principles
as set out in Article 5 of the TEU: conferral, subsidiarity, and proportionality."
Though at first glance this framework may seem to compose a small grant of
authority, the reality is that over time the EU's powers have expanded both by
additional inclusions of competences in the Treaties and by looser construction
of the treaties by the European Court of Justice (ECJ; the Court).
1. The principle of conferral.
The realms of power for the EU seem to be expressly limited to those
delegated to it by the TEU and TFEU. Article 5, Section 2 of TEU reads:
Under the principal of conferral, the Union shall act only within the limits
of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties
to attain the objectives set out therein. Competences not conferred upon
the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States.58
The TFEU specifically sets out three lists of EU powers, one of exclusive, one
of shared, and one of supplementary areas of authority. Interpreting only from
the text itself, it seems there are three potential ways of defining the scope of
"conferred" EU competences based on those explicit grants.
The first definition focuses on the clause "within the limits of the
competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties." This
clause seems to limit EU actions strictly to those that can be legitimately
characterized as exercises of competences explicitly set out in the TEU or
TFEU. Thus, one interpretation is that EU entities may only act when they can
point to a clause somewhere in the treaties justifying their action.
The second plausible way of interpreting this section draws from the clause
"to attain the objectives set out therein." If one posits that the "competences
conferred" must include any that are necessary to "attain the objectives," one
can shift the focus to the latter descriptor and broaden the scope of power from
the first interpretation. This interpretation adds breadth because the objectives
5s Though the two terms are not truly interchangeable, I will take them to be synonymous for the
purposes of this paper.
56 TEU, Art 5.
5 See Craig and de Burca, EU Law at 101 (cited in note 4).
ss TEU, Art 5 § 2
5 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Arts 3, 4, 6, 2010
OJ (C 83) 51-53 ("TFEU").
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set out in the Treaties are more broadly worded and therefore would encompass
greater authority than the more specific grants of competence.
Third, the conditions could be read to operate in combination-that is, in
order to exercise a power legitimately, the EU must first be able to point to an
explicit grant justifying that exercise, and then also demonstrate how it attains an
explicit objective in the Treaties. At first, this version of the inquiry might seem
redundant. But, one could conceive of an act that falls within a realm of
competence as granted explicitly but does not advance any objective. For
example, a labor market regulation that would otherwise be authorized by the
TEU might actually disrupt the market, rather than enhance coordination, which
would subvert TEU's objectives. And vice versa, many potential actions by the
EU could further an objective of the Treaties, despite having no explicit
authorization under any competence.
In applying the conferral principle, the ECJ has construed the Treaties
much more broadly than any of these interpretations would suggest. Two of the
most significant avenues to this expansion have been usage of an implied powers
doctrine and broad reading of Article 352 of the TFEU. As applied, these two
legal paths lead to wide EU competence for determining member policy. Yet,
the implied powers doctrine and usage of Article 352 have been restrained in
their capacity for expanding EU competence. Thus, fully assessing the EC's
ESM under the principle of conferral requires understanding this framework.
The implied powers doctrine has long existed in ECJ jurisprudence. Even
its wide formulation-which holds that the existence of a conferred objective or
function implies the existence of any power reasonably necessary to attain it-
has generally been accepted as legitimate by the Court.o Certainly the Court has
explicitly endorsed a more narrow construction of the doctrine. In Germany v
Commission, the Court affirmed the European Commission's competence to
require member states to participate in consultations and submit essential
information to the Commission to that end.6 ' The Court laid down a basic
statement of the narrow construction as accepted law: where the Treaties confer
competence on the EU to carry out some specific task, that conferral implies
"necessarily and per se the powers which are indispensable to carry out that task."62
But the Court has also indicated willingness to apply the implied powers
doctrine more broadly. In 2005, the ECJ affirmed the EU Council's enactment
of certain criminal provisions-which, considered separately, is almost certainly
beyond the EU's power-as valid because the provisions furthered the
6 Craig and de Burca, EU Law at 90 (cited in note 4).
61 Cases 281, 283-285, 287/85, 1987 ECR 3203 (1987).
62 Id at 28 (emphasis added).
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objectives of an environmental law that was within the Council's power." Rather
than the somewhat restrictive "indispensable to carry out that task" language
from Germany v Commission, the Court's more recent ruling authorizes the
Council to "[take] measures . . . which it considers necessary in order to ensure
that the rules which it lays down . . . are fully effective."64 Here, it is only
required that the Council consider its action necessary to making other valid
actions effective, as opposed to the action being objectively indispensable to the
very execution of a conferred competence. This is certainly a more expansive
understanding of implied powers than that displayed in Germany v Commission.
Yet the implied powers doctrine is not without its limits. Obviously, the
EU must be able to tie its actions to a legitimate reading of the Treaties
conferring some power to it. In that sense, then, the scope of the implied
powers doctrine is delimited by the legitimate reading of the Treaties.
Accordingly, the ECJ struck down a tobacco advertising and marketing
harmonization measure passed in accordance with the provision now located in
Article 95 permitting the adoption of harmonization measures for improving the
function of the internal the EU market.s The Court explicitly stated that reading
a power to regulate into Article 95 (then Article 1 00a) goes too far and constitutes
a violation of "the principle embodied in Article [5] . . . that the powers of the
Community are limited to those specifically conferred upon it."" Thus, there are
instances where EU attempts to legislate substantively are not supported by
implying powers into provisions of the Treaties that otherwise may seem to be
on point.
Another potentially broad path to justifying EU action comes in the form
of Article 352 of TFEU. This catch-all article gives the EU power to "adopt the
appropriate measures" when "action by the Union should prove necessary. . . to
attain one of the objectives set out in the Treaties" after abiding by the
prescribed procedure." As one commentator put it, if the Community's
institutions align in their reading of Article 352, "it would become virtually
impossible to find an activity which could not be brought within the objectives
of the Treaty.", 8 Thus, it seems that Article 352 justifies almost any EU action as
long as it furthers an explicit objective-not an explicitly conferred power.
Article 352, however, also has its limits. When the EU acceded to the
European Human Rights Convention in 1996, an opinion was issued that
63 Commission v Coundl Case C-176/03, 2005 ECR I-7879 (2005).
64 Id at T 48.
65 Germany v European Parament and Council, Case C-376/98, 2000 ECR I-8419 (2000).
SId at 83.
67 TFEU, Art 352.
68 J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformadion ofEurope, 100 Yale LJ 2403, 2445-46 (1991) (quotation omitted).
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included a comment regarding Article 352 (then Article 308).9 According to that
opinion, 352 may not be used to widen the scope of EU powers beyond the
framework created by the EU Treaties taken as a whole nor to create the
foundation for the adoption of provisions that would, in substance, amend the
Treaties without following the necessary amendment procedures." Further, the
procedure for invoking Article 352 is also an obstacle." If a measure is adopted
that does not explicitly refer to Article 352 and provide its own justification with
regard to its necessity, it will not be enforced.7
Thus, under the principle of conferral, an exercise of EU competence is
valid only if explicitly authorized in the Treaties, including under Article 352, or
if justifiable under the implied powers doctrine.
2. The principle of subsidiarity.
Where the Treaties have not explicitly granted exclusive competence, but
do allow for shared competence, EU actions must comply with the principle of
subsidiarity. The principle of subsidiarity found in Article 5 grants non-exclusive
authority "only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot
be sufficiently achieved by the Member States . . . but can rather, by reason of
the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level."
The functional application of this principle is governed by the Protocol on the
Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality (Second
Protocol), which is premised on the "wish [ofj ensur[ing] that decisions are taken
as closely as possible to the citizens of the Union.' 7 4 The Second Protocol
imposes specific procedural requirements on any exercise of the principle of
subsidiarity, including wide consultations, statements of justification and
compliance, 7  and a deliberate, although non-binding, national approval
process. Thus, this principle of EU power is, at least on its face, a restriction
on the exercise of non-exclusive competence.
69 Opinion 2/94, Accession of the Community to the Eumpean Human Rights Convention (1996) ECR 1-1759,
discussed in Craig and de Burca, EU Law at 93-94 (cited in note 4).
70 Id.
71 See Ingolf Pernice, The Treay of Lisbon: Mulilevel Constitutionaksm in Action, 15 Colurn J Eur L 349,
395-96 (2009).
72 See, for example, TariffPreferences Case, Commission v Coundl, Case 45/86, 1987 ECR 1493 (1987).
TEU, Art 5.
74 Protocol (No 2) on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality,
preamble, 2010 OJ (C 83) 206 ("Second Protocol").
7 Second Protocol, Art 2.
76 Second Protocol, Art 5.
n Second Protocol, Art 7.
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One could argue for at least two different applications of this principle.
First, the criteria for valid EU legislation could be applied conjunctively:
aggregate action by member states would be insufficient to achieve the
objectives of the proposed action and EU action will achieve those objectives
better. A second, less restrictive approach would simply incorporate the
consideration of whether the EU action would be more effective to accomplish
the action's objective, given the action's scale and effects, into the assessment of
whether the member states cannot sufficiently achieve that objective. Given the
"by reason of' connector in the clause, it seems the second version is more
appropriate. Further, the Commission has explained that the principle of
subsidiarity is really a test of comparative efficiency, which seems to confirm this
interpretation."
But it must be understood that the comparative test has usually been
weighted heavily in favor of the Community. After all, the EU's reason for
existing is to promote harmonization, a goal that inherently lends itself to
accomplishment at a higher level of government. Necessarily, then, the pursuit
of that goal "often [demands] Community action to ensure the uniformity of a
general approach which is of central importance to the realization of a common
market."79
The approach of the ECJ in applying the principle of subsidiarity has
generally reflected the logic above and resulted in only very loose enforcement
of procedural and substantive requirements for satisfying the principle."0 For
example, the Court affirmed a Council directive harmonizing labor law in the
Union regarding working time.8 ' As summarized by a commentator, "[o]nce the
Council had found it necessary to improve the existing level of protection and to
harmonize the law in this area . . . achievement of that objective necessarily
presupposed Community-wide action." 82 Thus, in general, it is unlikely that the
principle of subsidiarity would be utilized to strike down an EU action,
particularly where the action is one aimed at harmonization or standardization.83
78 See Craig and de Burca, EU Law at 101 (cited in note 4), discussing Commission Communication to the
Coundland the European Parhament, Bull EC 10-1992, 116.
79 Id at 104.
80 See id ("The indications are that the ECJ will not lightly overturn Community action on the
ground that it does not comply with Article 5").
8I United Kingdom v Council ("Working Time Directive Cae'", Case C-84/94, 1996 ECR 1-5755 (1996).
82 Craig and de Burca, EU Law at 105 (cited in note 4) (discussing UK v Council, 1996 ECR I-5755).
83 Id.
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3. The principle of proportionality.
The final principle governing the exercise of EU power is the principle of
proportionality. Article 5 explains that "the content and form of Union action
shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties."4
The ECJ has restated this principle as "requir[ing] that measures implemented
through Community law provisions be appropriate for attaining the legitimate
objectives pursued by the legislation at issue and . . . not go beyond what is
necessary to achieve them."" As with subsidiarity, this principle activates when
the EU is exercising a non-exclusive competence and combines with subsidiarity
to set a bound to its authority in that instance.
As set out recently by the ECJ, the application of the principle of
proportionality will invalidate a Community action "only if the measure is
manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent
institution is seeking to pursue."" Thus, the EU bodies are permitted wide
discretion in making their political, economic, and social policy choices,
provided that the decisions are based on objective criteria.17
For example, in 2002 the EU enacted ceilings for wholesale and retail
roaming charges for cell phone users and a requirement to inform the users of
those charges, with the objective of "ensuring that users of . .. public mobile
telephone networks when travelling within the Community do not pay excessive
prices for Community-wide roaming services when making calls and receiving
voice calls." 8 Phone service providers challenged the act before the ECJ,
arguing that the act's objective necessitated only the wholesale charge ceiling and
that room should have been left for market forces to govern retail charges
without the information requirement." In its opinion, the court noted that the
EU legislation had been premised on the concern that changes to the wholesale
market might not have ensured the desired effect on the retail market.90 In light
of its wide discretion in making that assessment, the ECJ concluded that the
concern was sufficient to find that the EU had not exceeded its competence
under the principle of proportionality."
84 TEU, Art 5.
85 Prehminay Ruiing in The Queen, on the appAcation of Vodafone, Ltd. v Secretay of State for Business,
Enterprise and Regulatog Reform, Case C-58/08, 2010 ECR 1-00000, 1 51 (June 8, 2010).
86 Id at 52.
87 Id at T 52-53.
88 Council Regulation 2002/21/EC, 2007 OJ (L 171) 36.
89 Application of Vodafone, Case C-58/08, 2010 ECJ at 54-61.
9o Id at 1 62-67.
91 Id at 70.
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Thus, it is unlikely that an action justified under the principle of conferral
and passing muster under the principle of subsidiarity would be nullified by the
principle of proportionality. If the scope of a measure can be legitimately (that is,
not by pretext) tied to advancing its objective, the ECJ would almost certainly
not void it.
III. LEGAL ARGUMENTS
Based on the legal framework set out in Section II, any legal argument
seeking to justify Community-level legislation would likely come in one of the
following forms. First, it may be neatly characterized within an explicit conferral
of exclusive power, in which case the inquiry would end. Second, the act may be
justified by Article 352 of the TFEU. Third, the legislation may be authorized by
an explicit grant of shared power. If so, the motivation and the scope of the act
must also comport with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.
Fourth, an act by the EU could be defended as an act of implied power. Thus,
the question to be confronted in this section is whether the bond-related
provisions of the EC's ESM decision can be justified by one of these three
arguments.
A. Explicit Conferral of Exclusive Power
The exclusive competences of the EU are set out in Article 3 of TFEU.
These are comprised of power in the areas of customs union, establishing the
competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market, setting
monetary policy for the Member States whose currency is the euro, and making
common commercial policy. 92 Importantly, there are also two other provisions
dealing specifically with budgetary matters-Articles 126 and 136. Article 126
grants the EU Council the power to intervene when a member state is running
an excessive budget deficit.9 3 Article 136 makes the EU Council responsible for
"strengthen[ing] the coordination and surveillance of [the member states']
budgetary discipline." 94 But, after consideration, any argument attempting to
justify the EC decision based on any of these explicit conferrals of exclusive
power falls short.
Of the brief list of exclusive powers set out in Article 3, none appropriately
encompasses an area that could reasonably be considered to include determining
specific sovereign bond provisions. Sovereign bonds are not correlated in any
92 TFEU, Art 3.
93 TFEU, Art 126. The authority of the EU in this circumstance is set out in 55 7-11, and "excessive
budget deficit" is defined in § 2.
9 TFEU, Art 136.
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plausible way to customs union, commercial policy, or internal competition
rules. The argument from the monetary policy power is more interesting,
though. The relationship between monetary policy and economic policy is an
"intimate" one, but there are "political difficulties for the [EU] in extending
control over national economic policy . . . lest it be accused of excessive
centralization of economic decision-making." 5 Articles 126 and 136 crystallize
the conundrum with particular regard to budgetary practices; however, the
Article 3 monetary power does not on its face appear to clearly grant the EU
competence to set the collective action clause and maturity term policies
recommended by the EC.
Article 126 at first seems to come closer to the mark. After all, it activates a
set of EU powers in the specific instance of member states running excessive-
that is, dangerous-budget deficits. But beyond the power to make
recommendations to the member state, Article 126 only provides for the power
of four enforcement mechanisms: requiring additional disclosures prior to bond
issuances; recommending that the European Investment Bank reconsider
lending to the member; requiring a deposit of sufficient collateral from the
member; and imposing fines.97 Thus, although the EU could recommend the
proposed term changes to bonds, it does not appear to have the power to
require them. Further, the target of action under Article 126 is clearly restricted
to members who are actually running, or are at risk of running, excessive budget
deficits.98 Therefore, imposing the EC bond requirements on all member states
cannot be supported by Article 126.
Unlike Article 126, Article 136 explicitly applies to all member states whose
currency is the euro and seems to provide for a broader power to monitor
budgetary matters of the member states." Specifically, the TFEU requires the
EU Council "to strengthen the coordination and surveillance of their budgetary
discipline."100 It seems sensible to stipulate that setting a standard for bond
terms strengthens coordination and surveillance of those bond terms-but do
bond terms relate to "budgetary discipline"?
Sovereign bond issuances certainly play a key role in financing national
budgets (or deficits, more particularly). An argument supporting the EC decision
would have to stress that point. Thus, one could legitimately argue that because
the cost of financing is tied to the terms as described in Section II, the
95 Craig and de Burca, EU Law at 741 (cited in note 4).
96 See generally TFEU, Art 126.
9 TFEU, Art 126, 11.
98 TFEU, Art 126, § 7.
99 TFEU, Art 136 1.
100 TFEU, Art 136 §1, cl (a).
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"coordination and surveillance" of those terms is correlated to the manageability
of national debts and budgets, particularly maturity terms. But, there are at least
three counterarguments.
First, the link between collective action clauses, maturity terms, and budget
management might be too attenuated. The pricing effects of those terms,
although real, could be counteracted or aggravated by other bond terms, and a
major factor in the cost of financing is overall macroeconomic health and other
risk factors, independent of the bond terms.' 1o Second, "budgetary discipline"
could be interpreted more restrictively to pertain to spending and taxing, rather
than to include debt financing. These two arguments could also be tied
together-because debt financing does not really pertain to budgetary discipline,
properly conceived of, the attenuated link between the clauses and the cost of
financing becomes even less convincing as a basis for supporting the EC
decision. Third, given that the economic and fiscal situations of the EU
countries are so varied, many member states will be negatively affected by the
restricted flexibility available to them in their bond offerings. The impact, in
theory, could be significant enough to impair a country's ability to manage its
budget, contravening the intent of Article 136. In total, and considered in
conjunction, the counterarguments appear stronger, even when reading the
Article 3 monetary power in combination with Article 136.
B. Article 352
Article 352 authorizes the EU to take appropriate action when "action by
the Union should prove necessary . .. to attain one of the objectives set out in
the Treaties." 10 2 By attachment to an explicit objective of the Treaties-not an
explicit competence-an act of the EU could be justified as within its explicitly
conferred power. Among the many objectives stated in the Treaties are
achieving "the strengthening and the convergence of their economies,"1
pursuing "the stability of the financial system,"'" and complying with the
guiding principle of "sound public finances."' 05 But, even if amenable to an
101 See Kerstin Bernoth, Jiirgen von Hagen, and Ludger Schuknecht, Sovereign Risk Premia in the
European Government Bond Market *56 (European Central Bank Working Paper Series, 2004),
online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=533129 (visited Feb 25, 2011).
See also Gianluigi Ferrucci, Empirical Determinants of Emerging Market Economies' Sovergn Bond
Spreads *7 (Bank of England Working Paper 2003), online at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=597422 (visited Feb 25, 2011).
102 TFEU, Art 352.
103 TEU, preamble.
10 TFEU, Art 127 5.
105 TFEU, Art 119 3.
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explicit objective, an EU action pursuant to Article 352 may not enlarge the
scope of EU power beyond the general framework of the Treaties or amount to
an amendment thereof.0 6
On initial consideration, the bond-term requirements seem to fit perfectly
within the overlap of the objectives stated above. The problems with sovereign
debt stocks have shaken financial systems across the EU (and around the world)
and weakened Europe's economies and ability to compete.' Further, one could
plausibly argue that an implicit objective underlying all other objectives is the
continued viability of the Union, which is legitimately threatened by serious debt
crises, according to EU president Herman von Rompuy.' 8 Thus, addressing
these problems in the way the EC decision proposes is in clear pursuit of these
various objectives.
Nonetheless, it may be countered that the fact that the bond requirements
could not be sufficiently tied to any explicit conferral of power severely weakens
the argument from Article 352. As has been noted by commentators, reading
Article 352 as argued above all but eliminates the inherent limitations created by
the principle of conferral.'09 Further, on a lower level of analysis, the objectives
recited above as justifying bond term requirements could arguably be read in
contrasting ways. Pursuing financial stability is an objective set out for the
European System of Central Banks and arguably, therefore, is restricted to its
banking practices, not Community legislation."o And the requirements may
actually undermine "sound public finances" in some countries that may derive
greater benefit from different terms.
Overall, an argument from Article 352 may be too shaky to be relied upon
exclusively as a justification, given the limitation that Article 352 should not be
read to expand on the framework of power as otherwise set out in the Treaties.
But, the conceptual overlap of the objectives mentioned above does seem to
lend itself to encompassing some power to prescribe certain fiscal policy choices
when the stability of the EU financial system is threatened. This argument, then,
106 Craig and de Burca, EU Law at 93-94 (cited in note 4), discussing Opinion 2/94, Accession of the
Community to the European Human Rights Convention (1996) ECR 1-1759.
107 See generally European Commission, Public Finances in EMU 2010 (cited in note 12).
10 See Eurogone cnsis 'threatens EU' (Aljazeera Nov 16, 2010), online at
http://english.aljazeera.net/business/2010/11/20101116101849606475.html (visited Feb 25,
2011). See also Budget Crisis Threatens EUR and EMU (Forex Hub Feb 10, 2010), online at
http://fxngold.com/forex/analysis/823-budget-crisis-threatens-eur-and-emu.html (visited Feb
25, 2011)
10 Weiler, 100 Yale L J at 2445-46 (cited in note 68).
110 TFEU, Art 127 § 5.
M See the discussion of pricing effects and the bond terms at issue in this Comment, Sections II.A
and II.B.
Vol. 12 No. 1222
Addressing the Debt Crisis in the European Union
might be enough to justify an EU action requiring collective action clauses and
long-term maturities. Yet, as will be explained below, Article 352 is not the
strongest available foundation for this position.
C. Explicit Conferral of Shared Power
TFEU provides for a set of shared competences in Article 4 and
supplementary powers in Article 6. The only potentially relevant area of shared
power in Article 4 is in matters concerning "economic, social and territorial
cohesion."1 l2 Article 6 does not include any relevant areas of competence.113
Ultimately, an informed reading of Article 4 undermines any attempt to justify
EU legislation consistent with the EC decision based on explicit conferral of
shared power.
A proponent seeking to rely on a shared power would have to argue that
legislation in accordance with the EC decision falls within the realm of economic
cohesion. Similar to an argument made above, an act establishing a standard for
bond issuances is obviously an act promoting some kind of cohesion. And the
decision on whether to include certain terms in a bond indenture is arguably an
"economic" one, if one understands "economic" to encompass "financial."
Thus, on its face, the argument in favor of including the power to prescribe
specific bond terms within the shared power in the area of economic, social, and
territorial cohesion seems to be a sensible one.
The proponent, if granted his initial argument, must also demonstrate that
the proposed EU bond provisions comport with the principles of subsidiarity
and proportionality. In Section II, this Comment explained that the principle of
subsidiarity would rarely be used to strike down an EU act, particularly where
the act is one to harmonize or standardize within a legitimate area of EU
power.114 The EC proposal would be precisely such an act. And based on the
application stipulated by the Commission, the test of comparative efficiency, EU
action in this area entails great comparative efficiency relative to national
action."'
Finally, the principle of proportionality must also be satisfied, which is
likely in this instance. The proposed bond requirements actually seem to be a
quite prudent means of achieving the stated objectives of the EC decision.
Further, based on the deferential analysis of the Vodafone, Ltd case discussed in
112 TFEU, Art 4, § 2.c.
113 TFEU, Art 6.
114 See Section II.C.2 (concluding from analysis of United Kingdom v Council (Working Time Directive
Case), Case C-84/94, 1996 ECR 1-5755 (1996)).
us See Opinion 2/94, (1996) ECR 1-1759.
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the subsection above, on the principle of proportionality, 116 the conclusion that
the inclusion of collective action clauses and extension of maturity terms might
not occur without EU action seems self-evident, in that EU countries have
already arrived at debt structures that do not incorporate the desired maturity
terms and may decide to preclude collective action clauses in the future."'
Unfortunately, the proponent would face fairly strong counterarguments
on the issues of conferral and, to a lesser extent, subsidiarity. Foremost, although
on a superficial basis the "economic cohesion" power seems to encompass the
bond requirements, a full reading of the TFEU undermines that interpretation.
Title XVIII of the TFEU sets out specifics relating to the economic, social, and
territorial cohesion power, and the introductory article to that title explains the
motivation behind the conferral of this power."' Specifically, the cohesion
power is to be used to "[reduce] disparities between the levels of development of
the various regions and the backwardness of the least favoured regions."" 9
Thus, a better interpretation of the Article 4 power would require that legislation
pursuant to that power be aimed at the objectives set out in Article 174:
correcting for socioeconomic inequalities. The collective action clause and
maturity term prescriptions would not satisfy that requirement.
On the principle of subsidiarity, despite the general presumption favoring
EU harmonization measures, there is some reason to doubt that EU action
presents significant comparative efficiency. First, collective action clauses
(CACs) are already a staple of sovereign bond issuances.' 20 Indeed, in 2006, over
60 percent of outstanding sovereign bonds contained CACs, and over 90
percent of new issuances between 2004 and 2007 included the terms.' 2 ' CACs
have become standard fare on their own, which arguably renders EU
interference to mandate them superfluous. As to maturity terms, the parallel
argument does not hold as well. One of the major problems that EU countries
116 See Appkcation of Vodafone, Case C-58/08, 2010 ECR at151.
117 In fact, the only EU member with an average maturity length over eight years is Britain, and at
least thirteen members have an average maturity under six years. For this information, consult the
"Debt-Average Debt Maturity" tab of the interactive chart in the online article Spreading infection
(Economist Feb 9, 2011), online at
http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2011/01/europes-economies (visited Feb 25,
2011).
1s TFEU, Art t74.
11' TFEU, Art 174.
120 See Ahdieh, 6 ChiJ Intl L at 241-42 (cited in note 31).
121 Sonke Haseler, Collective Action Clauses in International Sovereign Bond Contracts-Whence the Opposiion?
*5 (European Association of Law and Economics, 2009), online at
http://law.haifa.ac.il/eale/site/WorkingPapers/Binder%/ 20WP/20007.pdf (visited Apr 27,
2011).
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are facing is maturity peaking, which indicates overlapping maturities, likely of
different lengths. Further, it is unlikely that countries would willingly change to
consistent longer-term maturities if they have not already done so. Having
already weighed the benefits and drawbacks of short, medium, and long term
bonds, those countries arrived at the structure that was deemed best for them.
Thus, the analysis on the principle of subsidiarity yields mixed results.
On the whole, a proper reading of Article 4, as informed by Article 174,
would likely preclude a conclusion that EU legislation requiring the inclusion of
CACs and longer-term maturities could be justified by an explicit conferral of
shared power.
D. Implied Power
The ruling in Commission v Council sets out the basic principle of implied
powers as it stands currently: EU legislation, although not explicitly authorized
in the Treaties, may nevertheless be valid if it is necessary to make other valid
actions effective.12 2 An implied power, therefore, must be tied to a valid action.
The obvious course for a proponent of the bond requirements is to tie them to
the establishment of the ESM, which would be a valid action if events unfold as
the EC decision has planned-that is, if the power to create the ESM is
incorporated by amendment into the TFEU.12 3 Thus, the legal issue will be
whether mandating CACs and longer maturity terms is necessary to effecting the
ESM.
At this point, the policy implications of these two terms and their
relationship to the ESM become absolutely critical. In its published decision, the
EC describes the rationale for the two requirements vis-a-vis the ESM. One
aspect of the ESM, as proposed, would be to require a member state that
appears to be insolvent to negotiate with its private creditors a "comprehensive
restructuring plan . . . with a view to restoring debt sustainability."1 24 It is in
conjunction with this component of the ESM that the bond terms requirements
are proposed as a means "to facilitate this process" and "to avoid refinancing
peaks."' 2 ' Negotiations with private creditors are, undoubtedly, facilitated by
CACs: a supermajority is necessarily easier to achieve than unanimity. And
refinancing peaks would likely be mitigated in both frequency and severity if
maturity terms were extended over longer periods-provided that similarly
dated bonds are not issued in bunches.
122 See Commission v Council, Case C-176/03, 2005 ECR I-7879,148 (2005).
123 See European Council, Conclusions at 6-7 (cited in note 24).
124 Id at 9.
125 Id.
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Despite these obvious connections between CACs, maturity terms, and the
ESM, the countervailing policy concerns described above in Section II pose a
serious problem to arguing that the bond requirements truly serve the interests
of debt sustainability. 126 Specifically, longer maturity terms and CACs actually
make borrowing more expensive for less credit-worthy issuers, who are exactly
the countries whose debt is least sustainable. Which policy concerns should
prevail?
In a hypothetical judicial analysis of the matter, the weighing of these
policy concerns is probably a close enough matter to merit deference (or review
with a "light touch") to the choices of the EU legislative bodies. 127 Such review
of legislative discretion typically entails examination for "manifest error, misuse
of power, or clear excess in the bounds of discretion."1 28 1 The wisdom of
prioritizing facilitation of private restructuring and avoidance of refinancing
peaks over simply keeping borrowing costs as low as possible is clearly a
discretionary policy choice, one that would almost certainly not fall victim to
such deferential review. Thus, as laid out in this Comment, an argument from
the implied powers doctrine would likely justify the enactment of the CAC and
maturity term requirements in connection with the ESM as EU law.
IV. CONCLUSION
As with every financial crisis, the 2010 EU sovereign debt crisis has
brought to the attention of lawmakers a serious problem-in this case, the need
for a mechanism by which to address debt problems of member states. The
closely integrated nature of the EU has aggravated the recent crisis through the
mechanism of contagion, and if EU leaders desire further, sustainable
integration going forward, the debt problem will only loom larger over time.
More than ever, the health of the weakest members is determining the health of
the Union as a whole.
The EC has determined that its proposal for the ESM is the best answer
available for the EU. The primary component, a pool of financial aid for
troubled members, is to be enacted by amendment to the Treaties; but the
secondary legal aspects-requirements that members include CACs and longer
maturity terms in their bond issuances beginning in 2013-pose problems if
they are to be enacted simply as EU legislation.
Implicated in this discussion are the foundational principles governing the
two layers of sovereignty in the EU--conferral, subsidiarity, and proportionality.
126 See Sections IIA, II.B.
127 Craig and de Burca, EU Law at 569-71 (cited in note 4).
128 Id at 569.
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There is no explicit provision of the Treaties that appears to authorize particular
bond requirements, whether as an exercise of exclusive or shared power.
Further, the determination of bond terms is a fiscal decision, not a monetary or
economic one as has been traditionally understood in the EU. Interference into
the choice of bond terms, therefore, could be seen as a significant step toward
political integration into a European super-state via common fiscal policy, in
addition to the current monetary and economic integration.
Complicating this picture are the nuanced, complex economic
ramifications of CACs and maturity terms. In some instances, the goal of debt
sustainability is served well by modification provisions and longer maturity
terms; but in others, the total effect is not so clear. Particularly troubling is the
potential additional borrowing costs facing already troubled member states.
Longer maturity terms demand higher yields, and CACs, by increasing the odds
that bond terms could be altered, also increase the risk that creditors will not be
paid in full. Thus, the underlying policy choice entails weighing those higher
costs against enhanced flexibility in the event of a crisis and the decreased
probability of maturity bunches.
Overall, despite reflecting an economically questionable policy choice, the
enactment of the bond term requirements would most likely be viewed by the
EU judiciary as just that: a policy choice, deserving of judicial deference. The
competence to make that choice would seem to be granted as an implied power,
the power to determine what measures are necessary to achieve the objectives of
the ESM. Because the Stability Mechanism itself would be explicitly provided for
in the Treaties, it would serve as a legitimate hook. Whether that hook comes
attached to a line and sinker, and whether Europe's countries are consequently
reeled in to a new super-state, could end up being one of the most important
story lines of the century.
That end point is a definite possibility if the bond term provisions are
enacted as envisioned in this Comment. An actual challenge to the provisions
might not be far behind their enactment, especially given the growing sentiment
in the populations of core EU nations that they should not be harmed because
of the crises facing nations in the EU periphery.129 Based on the analysis
undertaken herein, the fate of such a challenge seems already woven into the law
of the implied powers doctrine. From the affirmation of these bond term
provisions, a domino effect potentially awaits-term mandates lead to budget
constraints lead to taxation requirements and so on-and ultimately, the best
way to govern a group of states that has come to exist under substantially
identical laws is with a single government. Of course, a line could always be
drawn at some point: but if not at bond term mandates, then where? And if a
129 See Bastian, Euro Gets Cold Shoulder at Ballot Box of Outrage (cited in note 37).
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line is to be drawn, who is to draw it? If a key member, such as Germany, were
to decide that its autonomy is more valuable than continued participation in the
EU project, it could quickly spell the end for the Union. Put simply, the EU
could quite possibly find itself at a crossroads with the onset of the ESM where
the choice between dissolution and true integration must finally be made. 130
13 Compare Bordo, The Euro Needs a Fiscal Union: Some Lessons from Histoy (cited in note 34), with
EuroZone cmis 'threatens EU'(cited in note 108).
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